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In this paper, we analyze the financial asset selection behavior of Japanese households. 
Especially, we focus on whether or not liquidity constraint decreases the amount of a household’s 
risky assets. To investigate this, we first empirically examine which types of household suffer 
from liquidity constraint. Then, based on the probability obtained from this first stage, we use the 
Tobit model to estimate the risky asset ratio (=risky asset/total financial asset), and examine the 
relationship between liquidity constraint and household portfolio.  
Our results show that the more households suffer from liquidity constraint, the less the 
households hold risky assets. This is consistent with previous empirical research on Italian 
households, implemented by Guiso et al.(1996). Our research suggests that the Japanese post-war 
financial system, which has provided money primarily to the industrial sector rather than the 
household sector (e.g. consumer loans), might lower the amount of risky assets held by Japanese 
households.    
(JEL classiflcations:D12,E2) 
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It is quite difficult to compare directly each nation's statistics on financial assets. If we 
want to make a precise comparison, we must adjust our data definition, coverage, and so forth. 
However, recently we often find this kind of effort being made. For example, international 
comparisons of personal savings rates in OECD nations based on survey data is typically carried 
out (Poterba ed. 1994). According to their results (see table 1), savings rates in Japan are the 
highest among six countries and show similar patterns to Italy, but the median value of net 
financial assets is far greater than Italy. More recently, we can find new projects such as 
“ International Savings Comparison Projects” on the web site.
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(Insert table 1 about here) 
 
Similarly, another researchers have shed light on more specific issues, household 
portfolios (Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli 2001). As Guiso et a1. mention in their preface, until 
recently, researchers in economics and finance paid relatively little attention to household 
portfolios, partly because of the difficulty of applying asset pricing theory, and partly because of 
the lack of micro data. In fact, it is almost impossible to do this kind of research without survey 
data. Therefore their work is very interesting and valuable but unfortunately, they just provide 
results for five countries (the United States, the United kingdom, Italy, Germany, and the 
Netherlands), so we constructed tables 2 and 3 adding adjusted Japanese data to their tables. Let 
us take a brief look at the overall characteristics of stockholding behavior. 
 
(Insert tables 2 and 3 about here)  
In table 2, we can see that the proportion of stockholders has increased drastically during 
the 1990s, although Japanese participation rates show a decreasing trend after1989. We can say 
that this is partly explained by severe recession and a weak stock market after the so-called 
“bubble economy.” We also find the proportion of direct stockholding is not so low in Japan, but 
it is a little bit misleading result. It tells us that we should use “direct and indirect” measures to 
understand the comprehensive effect of risky assets. In addition, a fairly robust finding is a 
hump-shaped age profile of participation in risky assets, reported in table 3. Although the average 
rate is almost the same between Germany, Italy and Japan, the Japanese distribution is more 
skewed towards those households with an older head. 
Here, we have concisely reviewed international comparison just for the purpose of 
establishing the trend. We need more diligent and devoted study if we would like to know further 
details. However, if we consider these stylized facts such as high savings rates, large median 
values of saving, and low proportion of stock holding, we can say that it is a very important task 
to analyze household portfolios in Japan.  
From this point of view, we focus on the relationship between liquidity constraint and 
household portfolios in Japan. More concretely, we examine whether liquidity constraint (the 
probability that households will suffer from liquidity constraint) reduces the amount of risky 
assets in the household. The reason is as follows. First, there are few analyses on this issue in 
Japan, largely due to lack of information. However, in this paper, we could use valuable data to 
get more precise estimation results and this is a great advantage. Second, liquidity constraint is an 
important topic in terms not only of empirical but also theoretical viewpoints. Therefore we can 
apply our results to another country if we can empirically show the effectiveness of economic theory. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review a series of research on 
liquidity constraint in Japan. In section 3, we briefly describe our data. In section 4, we explain 
our econometric model and estimation method. In section 5, we interpret our results with respect 
to the demand function of risky asset, and finally, we briefly summarize our findings.  
 
2. Some Explanations for low participation rate and small share of risky asset in Japan 
According to the 1998 Family Savings Survey conducted by Statistics Bureau, 
Management and Coordination Agency, the debt
2/income ratio of households was not so high 
(9.0%). On the other hand, it is sometimes said that Japanese households tend not to hold “risky 
assets
3,” and portfolio shares of risky assets are quite low (Yonezawa, Matsuura and Takezawa 
1999, Koto 2000). In short, characteristics of Japanese households portfolio is described as low 
share of consumer loan, low share of risky asset and high share of safe asset
4.For this reason, it is 
sometimes pointed out that enough money couldn't be supplied for enterprises with high-risk 
businesses in the Japanese capital market, and those companies were highly dependent on bank 
lending (Economic Planning Agency 1999). 
Many economists have tried to find “rational” reasons for explaining the low portfolio 
share of risky assets in Japanese households, just like any other country. For example, Matsuura 
(1999) pointed out the low rate of returns on stocks in Japan as one of the important factors. Koto 
(2000) proposed a strong preference for home ownership and consequent holding of a consumer 
loan. If households have to pay periodically for a housing loan, they would prefer to have safer 
assets to avoid uncertainty. Yonezawa et al.(1999) suggested that the Japanese seniority wage 
system is another important factor. Under the seniority wage system, companies can control workers’ wage rates in the long run. As a result, wage rates are relatively lower when workers are 
young and relatively more expensive when they are old. They call this an “invisible contribution” 
to the company and regard it as a kind of risky asset because this system makes it hard for 
workers to resign from their company when they are young. They propose the hypothesis that 
this “invisible contribution” reduces the portfolio share of risky assets in younger households, 
and produces a statistically significant result.  
Another explanation emphasizes the problem of liquidity (=borrowing) constraints. As 
Paxson (1990) showed households reduce illiquid (=difficult to convert to cash) assets and prefer 
to hold liquid assets to finance current consumption when a liquidity constraint exists and is 
exogenous. Although stocks can be easily converted to cash, prices may fluctuate drastically. 
Therefore, it may not always be possible to make up for a fall in income by selling stocks. It may 
also not be possible to cover unexpected expenditures due to illness etc. In this sense, we should 
classify risky assets as “illiquid” assets.” If households expect to suffer from liquidity constraint 
and expect not to be able to borrow money for the purpose of future consumption, it is rational 
for households to select to hold money as deposits, which can be easily exchanged for cash with 
no price change. From this viewpoint, Guiso et al. (1996) conducted an empirical analysis using 
Italian data, Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW1989) and showed liquidity 
constraints have a negative impact on the amount of risky assets.  
The primary purpose of this paper is, therefore, to examine whether liquidity constraint 
reduces the amount of, and portfo1io share of risky assets. If liquidity constraint does lower the 
portfolio share of risky assets, then the propagation of “consumer loans” will affect the 
households’ asset selection behavior and increase their portfolio share of risky assets. To achieve 
this purpose, we first empirically analyzed (1) what kinds of households suffer from liquidity constraint. Then, (2) based on the probabilities obtained from the first stage, we used the Tobit 
model and estimated the demand function for risky assets (again, defined as stocks plus 
investment trusts) ratio (=risky asset/total financial asset), and examined the relationship between 
liquidity constraint and household portfolio. Although there have been some previous studies in 
Japan analyzing the relation between liquidity constraint and consumption (Hayashi1985, Kohara 
and Horioka1999), this might be the first paper examining the relationship between liquidity 
constraint and portfolio share in Japan. We use micro data from the Sixth Survey on the Financial 
Asset Selection of Households (SFASH) conducted by the Institute for Posts and 
Telecommunications Policy (IPTP). This Survey includes direct questions on liquidity constraint 
as well as on income and assets, making it well-suited for our study. Guiso et al.(1996), who use 
the SHIW, and Kohara and Horioka (1999), who use the 1993 Panel Survey of Consumer 
Lifestyles (conducted by the Institute for Household Economy) also estimate the liquidity 
constraint function using micro data. Our method is similar to theirs.  
 
3. Data and Question  
3.1. Data  
The 1998 SFASH is a nationwide survey of 6,000 Japanese households with household 
heads aged above 20. The number of collected samples is 3,754. SFASH consists of questions on 
“income and assets,” such as the annual income of each member, the amount of tax payment and 
social insurance contributions, the total amount of and changes to financial assets by type
6, and 
the amount of debt. SFASH also includes information on age, gender, occupation and education 
status of the household head. In order to ensure the reliability of the data, we eliminated the 
following samples, considering the aim of our analysis.  1)  households which did not answer  
2)  the question on gender, age or occupation of the household head.  
3)  the question on the number of household members.  
4) all questions on each types of income, and samples of whose amount of disposable 
income was negative.  
As a result, we finally obtained 1605 effective samples. 
 
3.2. Questions on Liquidity Constraint  
SFASH includes following two direct questions on 1iquidity constraint.  
(A) 1 Question: Have you ever applied for a loan provided by a financial institution? If so, was 
your loan application turned down and/or was the total amount of the loan for 
which you applied reduced ? (single answer) 
  Answer:  1. Yes             2. No   
(A)-2 If you answered “1.Yes" to the above, 
  please circle more than one of the following questions: (multiple answer) 
  Answer:  1. Requested full amount of loan was approved. 
       2. Application was approved, but the amount of the loan was partly reduced. 
 3. Application was refused. 
 
(B)-1Question: Have you ever given up on applying for a loan because you thought your 
application  
might be turned down? (single answer) 
  Answer:  1. Yes             2. No   
 
More concretely, “liquidity constrained households” are described as follows; 
(a)Households that applied for a loan but were refused. (b)Households that applied for a loan but the amount of the loan was reduced (partially refused). 
(c)Households that didn't apply for a loan because they thought their application might be turned 
down (gave up beforehand). 
On the other hand, “no constrained households” are described as follows;  
(d)Households that applied for a loan and the total amount of loan was fully approved by the 
financial institution. 
(e)Households that didn't need a loan and as a consequence, did not apply for a loan 
Households that fell into categories (a) to (d) were households that needed a loan (households in 
category (c) were considered potential loan applicants).  
Clearly, these questions were asked about previous experiences of liquidity constraint, 
and not on current experience or future possibilities. However, there exist households that haven't 
applied for loan but consider they will need to apply for one in the near future. Or, there exist 
households whose applications were refused (or partially refused) in the past but who consider 
they aren't suffering from liquidity constraint now because their financial situation has been 
improved. Or, there exist households that have multi-experiences (e.g.(c)&(d)). If we could take 
these patterns into consideration, of course it would be favorable. However, we were forced to 
depend on previous experience because of data restrictions. We should be aware of this point 
when we interpret the estimation results.  
Tables on loan applicants (question (A)-1, (A)-2 and (B)-1) are summarized in table 4. 
 
(Insert table 4 about here) 
 
As we can see in panel A, among households that have applied for loans, the number of reduced households is 42 (2.52% of the total sample, 5.45% of the applicants), while the number 
of rejected households is 51 (3.18% of the total, 6.61% of the applicant). In panel B, we can see 
the number of households that hadn't applied for a loan and didn't apply as they thought their 
application might be turned down (gave up beforehand) is 81 (5.05% of the total). We can also 
see that the number of households that had applied for loans, and also gave up beforehand was 99 
(6.17% of the total). The number of households that had had two experiences, (c) and (d), is 45 
(2.80% of the total, 6.64% of the non refused households)(in panel C). The last case might be 
thought of as households that have had multi-loan experiences in the past-  
In this paper, we define samples classified at least once in (a), (b) or (c) as “liquidity 
constrained households,” because it is natural for us to think that the past experience of liquidity 
constraint would affect their future behavior on asset selection. Thus, the number of our defined 
sample is 219 (13.64%of the total), including both households that did not apply for loan as they 
thought their application might be turned down (180) and that applied for a loan but partially 
refused or totally rejected (26+13).  
Our definition corresponds to Kohara and Horioka (1999)'s definition (3), which counts 
6.87% of households with a spouse as “liquidity constraint households.” In addition, Guiso et 
a1.(1996), whose definition is almost the same as ours, counts 1,249 of 8,017 (15.58%) as 
“liquidity constraint households.” Previous researches based on direct questions about liquidity 
constraint report a much smaller number than Zeldes (1989), Hayashi (1985). This means proxy 
variables used by Zeldes and Hayashi might not be appropriate. However, even in this paper, we 
didn't ask from whom households could borrow. In addition, as we mentioned before, our 
research is based only on previous experience of liquidity constraint and not on present/future 
information. We should be cautions when we interpret the results
8.  4. Econometric Model and Variables 
4.1. Econometric Model 
As a first step, we estimated the liquidity constraint function based on a households’ liquidity 
constraint by using the probit model. Then, based on the probability obtained from the first step, 
we used the Tobit model and estimated risky asset ratio (=risky asset/total financial asset), and 
examined the relationship between liquidity constraint and household portfolio. In this estimation 
process, we also avoided the heteroscedasticity problem.  
In the first step, we use the following probit model. The dependent variable y1 is 1 if 
households face a liquidity constraint, while y1 is 0 if they don't.  
y*1i =a+ bxi + ui                                                              1) 
y1i    = 1      if  y*1i > 0 
= 0       otherwise   
In this model, “a” and “b” are the parameters to be estimated, xi is the vector of the 
explanatory variables, ui is an error term (assumed to follow the i.i.d. process).  
The log likelihood function for equation 1) is given by 
L=ΠΦ ((a+b xi)/σ)Π(1-Φ ((a+b xi )/σ)                                        
  ￿ ￿   y1i= 1                                  y1i= 0 
 
The log likelihood is given by 
LLi=y1i Log Φ ((a+bxi)/σ)+(1-y1i) Log(1-Φ ((a+bxi)/σ))                          2) 
LogLL=ΣLLi 
 
Here, Φ (.) denotes the cumulative distribution function. 
We can estimate the cumulative distribution function from equation (2), after normalizing as  σ =l in the case of homoskedasticity. However, in the case of heteroscedasticity (σ=σi), 
consistency of the estimated value can no longer be held (Harvey 1976, Yatchew and Grilicks 
1984). So we use the LM (Lagrange-multiplier) test to examine heteroscedasticity, following the 
method explained in Greene (2000)
9. 
Next, we consider the risky asset ratio (=risky asset/total financial asset). The ratio ranges 
from 0 to 100. In this case, the Tobit model with truncation in both ends is,  
 
y*2i=a+bxi+ui                                                                3) 
      y2i=100      if  y*2i>100 
        = y*2i   if  0 <= y*2i <= 100 
            =0       if   y*2i<0 
 
The log likelihood function of the obit model is as follows (see Maddala (1983)). 
 
LogL=Σ log (Φ((100-a-bxi)/σ))+Σ log(1-Φ((0-a-bxi)/σ))                                            4) 
            y*2i>100                                             y*2i<0 
         + Σ log (1/ σ *ƒÕ(y*2i-a-bxi)/ σ))                     
          0 <= y*2i<= 100 
 
  Like the Probit model, consistency of the estimated value by the Tobit model can no 
longer be held in the case of heteroscedasdeity. So we also use the LM test to examine 
heteroskedasticity, following Greene (2000), pp. 912-914.  
 
 4.2. Variables 
(Liquidity Constraint) 
For the liquidity constraint (represented as SEIYAKU), the following were adopted as 
explanatory variables: log of household disposable income (LDISP), log of household financial 
assets (LWEALTH), log of self-estimated real assets (LREAL), age of household head (AGE), 
square of AGE (AGE2, but divided by 100) and dummy variable for gender (FEMALE, =1 if 
household head is female). Regarding the occupation of the household head, a dummy variable 
SELFAGRI is 1 if his/her job is self-employed/agro forestry, PART is 1 if his/her job is part 
time, NOJOB is 1 if he/she doesn't have a job. With respect to the education of the household 
head, University (UNIV) and Junior high school (JUNIOR) graduation dummy were adopted
10. 
LDISP was a variable for measuring the effect of budget constraint. We expected a 
negative sign if the greater the income, the less the need to borrow. On the other hand, we 
expected a positive sign if LDISP showed a strong demand for borrowing. It could be determined 
by empirical analysis. LWEALTH and LREAL were used to measure the asset effect, and we 
expected a negative sign for the coefficient. AGE and AGE2 were for measuring the effect of the 
difference in life stage, so we could not determine the ex/ante sign of the coefficient. The 
occupation dummy was for measuring the need for borrowing by occupation (e.g. we expected 
self-employed households needed much more borrowing than others). Education was adopted as 
a control variable for lifetime income. 
 
(Risk Asset Ratio) 
We estimated the risk asset ratio in two different ways.  
In the first case, we adopt the log of the “risky asset/total financial asset" ratio (LRISK) as a dependant variable. As explanatory variables, we used the log of the estimated probability of 
liquidity constraint. Here, we used LPROB instead of SEIYAKU because we wanted to measure 
the continuous effect of a liquidity constraint. In addition, we adopted the log of the 
“income/financial asset” ratio (LDISPWEL), the log of the “debt/financial asset” ratio 
(LDEBWEL) and the log of the “self-estimated real asset/financial asset" ratio (LREWEL) to 
avoid heteroscedasticity. Further, dummy variable HOUSING (=1 if household had housing loan) 
and UNIV were added.  
In the second stage, we adopted “risky asset/total financial asset” ratio (RISKY) as a 
dependant variable. As explanatory variables, we used the estimated probability of liquidity 
constraint (PROB). Furthermore, we adopted “disposable income/financial asset” ratio 
(DISPWEL), “debt/financial asset” ratio (DEBWEL), home-ownership dummy MYHOME (=1 if 
household head had own house), HOUSING and UNIV.  
If liquidity constraint restricts the risky asset ratio of a household, we expected a negative 
sign for the coefficient of LPROB or RISK. Our primary purpose was to examine it. We could 
not determine the ex-ante sign of LDISPWEL and DISPWEL, because it was possible for 
households whose head were retired to have a small income with a large amount of financial 
asset. In this case, the capability to hold risky asset was small if we considered the “flow” side 
while large if we considered the “stock” side. We expected negative signs for the coefficients of 
LDEBWEL and DEBWEL, and positive signs of the coefficients of LREWEL or MYHOME. We 
expected households with housing loans would increase their safe asset because they had to pay 
for their debt periodically (refer tokoto2000). Thus we expected a negative sign for the 
Coefficient of HOUSING. We adopted UNIV as a proxy for information processing capability 
because we needed a highly complicated judgment such as a target bland and/or timing for stock investment. We expected a positive sign for UNIV.  
 
4.3. Test for the mean difference between two subgroups 
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the principle variables. Before estimation, we 
divided the samples into two subgroups; one was households with a liquidity constraint 
(subgroup 1), and the other was households with no constraint (subgroup 2). Then we statistically 
tested the mean differences in the principal variables between the two subgroups (refer to z-value 
in Table 5). 
 
(Insert table 5 about here) 
 
We found a statistically significant difference at the 1% level for RISK, RISKY and 
LRISKFIN (= log of amount of financial risk asset). Subgroup 1 had greater mean values than 
subgroup 2 on all three variables. This fact shows liquidity constraint might have an effect on 
households’ asset selection behavior.  
LWEALTH and LREAL have a significant mean difference between two subgroups at the 
1% level, although LDISP doesn’t have a significant difference. In addition, subgroup 1 has 
greater mean values than subgroup 2 on LWEALTH and LREAL. It means that the amount of 
both real and financial assets has a strong effect on whether households suffer from liquidity 
constraint or not. 
AGE and AGE2 seems not to have a significant mean difference. Speaking of occupation, 
subgroup 2 shows greater values than subgroup 1 on SELFAGRI and PART dummies. With 
respect to education, we should be aware that subgroup 1 has greater mean than subgroup 2 on UNIV. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1. Estimation on Liquidity Constraint 
The estimation results for the liquidity constraint function are shown below. 
 
 
SEIYAKU=-2.687    -0.017*LDISP-0.077*LWEALTH-0.034*LREAL+0.098*AGE       5) 
        (-4.090)
***  (-0.295)       (-3.884)
***             (-2.678)
***         (4.088)
*** 
                  -0.105*AGE2+0.089*FEMALE+0.474*JIEIAGRI+0.398*PART+0.461*NOJOB 
                (-4.314)
***         (0.656)                (4.460)
***              (1.998)
**        (3.046)
*** 
         +0.215*JUNIOR-0.289*UNIVERSITY                             
                (2.064)
**             (-2.595)
*** 
               
 LL -597.12,   LM test statistics 2.163 
 
       (Asymptotic t-value is shown in parenthesis, 
***, 
**, 
*, shows significance level at 10%, 5% 
1%, LL denotes log likelihood, LM denotes Lagrange multiplier. These signs have the 
same meaning through this paper). 
 
Because the critical value of the chi-square distribution at the 95% significance level is 
3.84, LM test statistics, 2.163, means the null hypothesis, “homoscedasticity at a 95% 
significance level,” wouldn't be rejected. In other words, the null hypothesis “homoscedasticity" 
is supported. 
In equation (5), the signs of the coefficients are almost the same as we expected. 
Although LDISP is not significant, LWEALTH and LREAL are significantly negative at the 1% 
level. It means that the richer households are, the less they are suffering from a liquidity 
constraint. Speaking of occupation, because SELFAGRI is significantly positive at the 1% level, 
households in this category seem to have strong needs to borrow (or a high possibility of facing liquidity constraint) because of income uncertainty. With respect to education, because JUNIOR 
is significantly positive at the 5% level and UNIV is significantly negative at the 10% level, it 
shows expected future high (low) income leads to low (high) probability of suffering from 
liquidity constraint. 
 
5.2. Estimation of Portfolio Share of Risky Assets 
The estimation results using LRISK are shown in equation (6) and results using RISKY 
are shown in equation (7). The LM test statistics are 0.48 and 1.57 respectively. Here, like 
equation (5), the null hypothesis, “homoscedasticity," is supported. 
 
 
  LRISKY=-0.197   -2.949*LPROB-2.430*LDISPWEL-0.540*LDEBWEL            6) 
                 (-0.141)
    (-5.624)
***        (-9.208)
***                 (-1.899)
*           
                <-0.432>  <-0.356>                                      <-0.079>  
          +0.528*LREWEL+2.448*UNIVERSITY-0.293*HOUSING           
 (2.036)
**              (3.883)
***                 (-0.481)
** 
                  <0.077> 
 
   σ=6.586(20.167)   LL=-1376.91   LM=0.48  
           < > denotes marginal effect around sample means. 
 
The coefficient of LPROB is significantly negative at the 1% level. Thus, we guess the 
greater the increase in probability of facing a liquidity constraint, the less the portfolio share of 
risky assets which households hold. The marginal effect around the sample mean is -0.432. 
Because the mean and median of LRISKY are 0.9807 and 0, we can say that the effect of 
liquidity constraint for households to decrease risky assets, is not so weak.  
In equation (6), the coefficient of HOUSING is negative but statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficient of LDISPWEL is significantly negative at the 1% level. It might 
reflect the fact that the capability of holding risky household assets for households with an aged 
head is high enough, because they receive a low income but hold a large amount of financial 
assets. The coefficient of LDEBWEL is significantly negative at the 10 % level while the 
coefficients of LREWEL and UNIV are significantly positive at the 50 % and 10 % level. 
 
  RISKY=-26.732   -1.269*PROB-1.902*DISPWEL+0.165*DEBWEL                                7) 
               (-5.245)
***  (-4.970)
***    (-3.348)
***              (3.271)
***             
              <-0.124>    <-0.189>      <0.016>      
        +16.260*MYHOME+15.378*UNIVERSITY-8.209*HOUSING   
         (4.894)
***                   (4.773)
***                   (-2.570)
**        
                                                     
   σ=34.603(20.860)   LL=-1863.35   LM=1.57 
 
In equation (7), the coefficient of PROB is also negative at the 10 % level. Therefore we 
get to know the former result; the greater the increase in probability of facing a liquidity 
constraint, the less the assets which households hold, is strongly supported. The marginal effect 
of PROB is -0.124.  
Table 6 shows RISK and the expected value of RISKY when PROB increases, under the 
condition that DISPWEL and DEBWEL are the sample means, MYHOME=1, HOUSING=1 and 
UNIV=1. If PROB increase from 10% to 20%, RISK and the expected value of RISKY decrease 
9.70 % and 1.97 % respectively. We can interpret this simulation result as an indication of the 
strength of the effect of liquidity constraint.  
 
(Insert table 6 about here) 
 Note that the coefficient of HOUSING is significantly negative at the % level in equation 
(7). It means risky assets with a drastic price fluctuation would be restricted because housing 
loans must be repaid periodically. The coefficient of DISPWEL is significantly negative at the 
1 % level while the coefficient of DEBWEL is significantly positive at the 1 % level. We need 
further investigation of these points. The coefficient of MYHOME and UNIV are significantly 
positive at the 1% level. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we propose liquidity constraint as one of the factors restricting the portfolio share 
of risky assets in Japanese households. To examine this hypothesis, we estimated the probability 
of liquidity constraint, and showed that it restricts the portfolio share of risky assets. If 
households anticipate the possibility of facing a liquidity constraint in future, it is rational for 
them to restrict the portfolio share of risky assets. This is because, if households anticipate an 
income fall or unexpected expenses in the future, they need to hold safer financial assets to 
prepare for it. In addition, in this paper, we also confirm that the portfolio share of risky assets 
can be restricted if households have a housing loan. This might be affected by the fact that it is 
not so easy to roll over a housing loan in Japan.
11 Our results are almost the same as the Italian 
case by Guiso et a1.(1996), so we can say that we could also empirically show the correctness of 
the theoretical implication by Paxson (1990) based on Japanese data. We hope this kind of 
empirical research will be examined in other countries, and that this kind of effort will bring a 
better understanding of international differences in saving behavior, portfolio behavior, and so 
forth. 
Lastly, let's think about the specific reasons for the low portfolio share of risky assets in the Japanese market. After World War II, Japanese banks have supplied most of their money to 
companies and have not supplied much money to households (e.g. consumer loans). According to 
the financial settlement at the end of March 1999, there has been an increase in lending to 
individuals. However, if we look in detail, consumer loans are decreasing while housing loans are 
increasing. Consumer loans by 10 city banks were down 105%(while the total amount of lending 
was down 6.0%), down 5.9 % (down 0.1 %) by regional banks, and down 7.2 % (up 4.2 %) by 
second tier regional banks (Kinyu Journal, May 2000). The fact that the percentage decline in 
consumer loans is greater than the percentage decline in total lending, would seem to be due to 
the increase in personal bankruptcies and the shrinkage of banks during the recession. It is partly 
because Japanese banks’ inability to screen an individual’s financial capability due to their 
negative attitude toward consumer loans. The characteristics of Japanese households’ financial 
asset selection behavior should be understood in relation to the financial system described above.[References] 
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 1 Please see http://www.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/boersch/forchung/intern-savings.htm The project wazs performed 
under the auspices of the EU-sponsored TMR (Training and Mobility of Researchers) Project on Savings and 
Pensions. 
2 This “debt" means “ consumer loan” which excludes mortgage. 
3 Here we define “risky assets” as “stocks plus investment trusts." This definition corresponds to “ direct and indirect 
holdings in tables 2 and 3. 
4 A “safe asset” means “savings and deposits.” 
5 Koto (2000)'s finding, “housing loans and risky assets are substitutable” may also be interpreted in the same way. 
6 E.g. savings, deposits, stocks, investment trust. 
7 Similar questions were asked as part of the Panel Survey of Consumer Lifestyles used by Kohara and Horioka 
(1999). However, the sample for that survey consisted of females aged 20~34. 
8 Speaking of the subgroup which didn’t apply for a loan and gave up beforehand, they seemed not to be able to 
borrow money because they didn't have enough capability even though they had full information. In this sense, they 
are different from the subgroup whose applications were refused or partially refused. We can analyze the equation 
excluding the former subgroup, but even in this case, new problems such as sample selection bias will arise. One 
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additional task for our future research.  
9 Greene (2000) pp.826-829. Let’s say, Var(ui)= σ2i = {exp(czi)} 2.. zi means a possible factor of hetero- 
sckedasticity, while c means a parameter to be estimated. We can examine the LM test subject to c=0. 
10 For household annual income, we compare total income from each individual source (such as business revenues or 
salaries) with total annual income of each household member, and adopt the larger amount. Similarly, for financial 
assets, we adopt the larger amount of either the total financial assets or the sum of each type of financial asset. 
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